

Quantum-like Probabilistic Models outside Physics

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Abstract

We present a quantum-like (QL) model in that contexts (complexes of e.g. mental, social, biological, economic or even political conditions) are represented by complex probability amplitudes. This approach gives the possibility to apply the mathematical quantum formalism to probabilities induced in any domain of science. In our model quantum randomness appears not as irreducible randomness (as it is commonly accepted in conventional quantum mechanics, e.g., by von Neumann and Dirac), but as a consequence of obtaining incomplete information about a system. We pay main attention to the QL description of processing of incomplete information. Our QL model can be useful in cognitive, social and political sciences as well as economics and artificial intelligence. In this paper we consider in a more detail one special application – QL modeling of brain's functioning. The brain is modeled as a QL-computer.

Keywords: Incompleteness of quantum mechanics, Quantum-like Representation of Information, Quantum-like Models in Biology, Psychology, Cognitive and Social Sciences and Economy, Context, Complex Probabilistic Amplitude

1 Introduction: Quantum Mechanics as Operation with Incomplete Information

Let us assume that, in spite of a rather common opinion, quantum mechanics is not a complete theory. Thus the wave function does not provide a complete description of the state of a physical system. Hence we assume that the viewpoint of Einstein, De Broglie, Schrödinger, Bohm, Bell, Lamb, Lande, 't Hooft and other believers in the possibility to provide a more detailed description of quantum phenomena is correct, but the viewpoint of Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Fock, Landau and other believers in the completeness of quantum mechanics (and impossibility to go beyond it) is wrong. We remark that the discussion on

completeness/incompleteness of quantum mechanics is also known as the discussion about *hidden variables* – additional parameters which are not encoded in the wave function. In this paper we would not like to be involved into this great discussion, see e.g. [1], [2] for recent debates. We proceed in a very pragmatic way by taking advantages of the incompleteness viewpoint on quantum mechanics. Thus we would not like to be waiting for until the end of the Einstein-Bohr debate. This debate may take a few hundred years more.¹

What are advantages of the Einstein's interpretation of the QM-formalism?

The essence of this formalism is not the description of a special class of physical systems, so called quantum systems, having rather exotic and even mystical properties, but the possibility to operate with *incomplete information* about systems. Thus according to Einstein one may apply the formalism of quantum mechanics in any situation which can be characterized by incomplete description of systems. This (mathematical) formalism could be used in any domain of science, cf. [4]–[7], [8], [9], : in cognitive and social sciences, economy, information theory. Systems under consideration need not be exotic. However, the complete description of them should be not available or ignored (by some reasons).

We repeat again that in this paper it is not claimed that quantum mechanics is really incomplete as a physical theory. It is not the problem under consideration. We shall be totally satisfied by presenting an information QL model such that it will be possible to interpret the wave function as an incomplete description of a system. It might occur that our model could not be applied to quantum mechanics as a physical theory. However, we shall see that our model can be used *at least outside physics*. Therefore we shall speak about a quantum-like (QL) and not quantum model.

We shall use Einstein's interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics. This is a special mathematical formalism for statistical decision making in the absence of complete information about systems. By using this formalism one permanently ignore huge amount of information. However, such an information processing does not induce chaos. It is extremely *consistent*. Thus the QL information cut off is done in a clever way. This is the main advantage of the QL processing of information.

We also remark that (may be unfortunately) the mathematical formalism for operating with probabilistic data represented by complex amplitudes was originally discovered in a rather special domain of physics, so called quantum physics. This historical fact is the main barrier on the way of applications of QL methods in other domains of science, e.g. biology, psychology, sociology, economics. If one wants to apply somewhere the mathematical methods of quantum mechanics (as e.g. Hameroff [10], [11] and Penrose [12], [13] did in study of brain's functioning) he would be typically constrained by the conventional interpretation of this formalism, namely, the orthodox Copenhagen

¹Even if quantum mechanics is really incomplete it may be that hidden parameters would be found only on scales of time and space that would be approached not very soon, cf. [3]

interpretation. By this interpretation quantum mechanics is complete. There are no additional (hidden or ignored) parameters completing the wave function description. Quantum randomness is not reducible to classical ensemble randomness, see von Neumann [14], Birkhoff and von Neumann [15].² It is not easy to proceed with this interpretation to macroscopic applications.

In this paper we present a contextualist statistical realistic model for QL representation of incomplete information for any kind of systems: biological, cognitive, social, political, economical. Then we concentrate our considerations to cognitive science and psychology [7], [16]. In particular, we shall describe cognitive experiments to check the QL structure of mental processes.

The crucial role is played by the *interference of probabilities for mental observables*. Recently one such experiment based on recognition of images was performed, see [17], [7]. This experiment confirmed our prediction on the QL behavior of mind. In our approach “quantumness of mind” has no direct relation to the fact that the brain (as any physical body) is composed of quantum particles, cf. [10]–[13]. We invented a new terminology “quantum-like (QL) mind.”

Cognitive QL-behavior is characterized by a nonzero *coefficient of interference* λ (“coefficient of supplementarity”). This coefficient can be found on the basis of statistical data. There are predicted not only $\cos\theta$ -interference of probabilities, but also hyperbolic $\cosh\theta$ -interference. The latter interference was never observed for physical systems, but we could not exclude this possibility for cognitive systems. We propose a model of brain functioning as a QL-computer. We shall discuss the difference between quantum and QL-computers.

From the very beginning we emphasize that our approach has nothing to do with *quantum reductionism*. Of course, we do not claim that our approach implies that quantum physical reduction of mind is totally impossible. But our approach could explain the main QL-feature of mind – *interference of minds* – without reduction of mental processes to quantum physical processes. Regarding the quantum logic approach we can say that our contextual statistical model is close mathematically to some models of quantum logic [18], but interpretations of mathematical formalisms are quite different. The crucial point is that in our probabilistic model it is possible to combine *realism* with the main distinguishing features of quantum probabilistic formalism such as *interference of probabilities*, *Born’s rule*, *complex probabilistic amplitudes*, *Hilbert state space*, and *representation of (realistic) observables by operators*.

²The founders of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation, Bohr and Heisenberg as well as e.g. Pauli and Landau, did not discuss so much probabilistic aspects of this interpretation. This is an astonishing historical fact, since quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory.

2 Levels of Organization of Matter and Information and their Formal Representations

This issue is devoted to the principles and mechanisms which let matter to build structures at different levels, and their formal representations. We would like to extend this issue by considering information as a more general structure than matter, cf. [19]. Thus material structures are just information structures of a special type. In our approach it is more natural to speak about *principles and mechanisms which let information to build structures at different levels, and their formal representations*. From this point of view quantum mechanics is simply a special formalism for operation in a consistent way with incomplete information about a system. Here a system need not be a material one. It can be a social or political system, a cognitive system, a system of economic or financial relations.

The presence of OBSERVER collecting information about systems is always assumed in our QL model. Such an observer can be of any kind: cognitive or not, biological or mechanical. The essence of our approach is that such an observer is able to obtain some information about a system under observation. As was emphasized, in general this information is not complete. An observer may collect incomplete information not only because it is really impossible to obtain complete information. It may occur that it would be convenient for an observer or a class of observers to ignore a part of information, e.g., about social or political processes.³

Any system of observers with internal or external structure of self-organization should operate even with incomplete information in a consistent way. The QL formalism provides such a possibility.

We speculate that observers might evolutionary develop the ability to operate with incomplete information in the QL way – for example, brains. In the latter case we should consider even *self-observations*: each brain performs measurements on itself. We formulate the hypothesis on the QL structure of processing of mental information. Consequently, the ability of QL operation might be developed by social systems and hence in economics and finances.

If we consider *Universe as an evolving information system*, then we shall evidently see a possibility that Universe might evolve in such a way that different levels of its organization are coupled in the QL setting. In particular, in this model quantum physical reality is simply a level of organization (of information structures, in particular, particles and fields) which is based on a consistent ignorance of information (signals, interactions) from a *prequantum level*. In its turn the latter may also play the role of the quantum level for a pre-prequantum one and so on. We obtain the model of Universe having many (infinitely many) levels of organization which are based on QL representations of information coming from the previous levels.

In same way the brain might have a few levels of transitions from the

³We mention that according to Freud's psychoanalysis human brain can even repress some ideas, so called hidden forbidden wishes and desires, and send them into the unconsciousness.

classical-like (CL) to the QL description.

At each level of representation of information so called physical, biological, mental, social or economic laws are obtained only through partial ignorance of information coming from previous levels. In particular, in our model the quantum dynamical equation, the Schrödinger's equation, can be obtained as a special (incomplete) representation of dynamics of classical probabilities, see section 12.

3 Växjö Model: Probabilistic Model for Results of Observations

A general statistical realistic model for observables based on the contextual viewpoint to probability will be presented. It will be shown that classical as well as quantum probabilistic models can be obtained as particular cases of our general contextual model, the *Växjö model*.

This model is not reduced to the conventional, classical and quantum models. In particular, it contains a new statistical model: a model with hyperbolic *cosh*-interference that induces "hyperbolic quantum mechanics" [7].

A physical, biological, social, mental, genetic, economic, or financial *context* C is a complex of corresponding conditions. Contexts are fundamental elements of any contextual statistical model. Thus construction of any model M should be started with fixing the collection of contexts of this model. Denote the collection of contexts by the symbol \mathcal{C} (so the family of contexts \mathcal{C} is determined by the model M under consideration). In the mathematical formalism \mathcal{C} is an abstract set (of "labels" of contexts).

We remark that in some models it is possible to construct a set-theoretic representation of contexts – as some family of subsets of a set Ω . For example, Ω can be the set of all possible parameters (e.g., physical, or mental, or economic) of the model. However, in general we *do not assume the possibility to construct a set-theoretic representation of contexts*.

Another fundamental element of any contextual statistical model M is a set of observables \mathcal{O} : each observable $a \in \mathcal{O}$ can be measured under each complex of conditions $C \in \mathcal{C}$. For an observable $a \in \mathcal{O}$, we denote the set of its possible values ("spectrum") by the symbol X_a .

We do not assume that all these observables can be measured simultaneously. To simplify considerations, we shall consider only discrete observables and, moreover, all concrete investigations will be performed for *dichotomous observables*.

Axiom 1: *For any observable $a \in \mathcal{O}$ and its value $x \in X_a$, there are defined contexts, say C_x , corresponding to x -selections: if we perform a measurement of the observable a under the complex of physical conditions C_x , then we obtain the value $a = x$ with probability 1. We assume that the set of contexts \mathcal{C} contains C_x -selection contexts for all observables $a \in \mathcal{O}$ and $x \in X_a$.*

For example, let a be the observable corresponding to some question: $a = +$ (the answer “yes”) and $a = -$ (the answer “no”). Then the C_+ -selection context is the selection of those participants of the experiment who answering “yes” to this question; in the same way we define the C_- -selection context. By Axiom 1 these contexts are well defined. We point out that in principle a participant of this experiment might not want to reply at all to this question. By Axiom 1 such a possibility is excluded. By the same axiom both C_+ and C_- -contexts belong to the system of contexts under consideration.

Axiom 2: *There are defined contextual (conditional) probabilities $\mathbf{P}(a = x|C)$ for any context $C \in \mathcal{C}$ and any observable $a \in \mathcal{O}$.*

Thus, for any context $C \in \mathcal{C}$ and any observable $a \in \mathcal{O}$, there is defined the probability to observe the fixed value $a = x$ under the complex of conditions C .

Especially important role will be played by probabilities:

$$p^{a|b}(x|y) \equiv \mathbf{P}(a = x|C_y), a, b \in \mathcal{O}, x \in X_a, y \in X_b,$$

where C_y is the $[b = y]$ -selection context. By axiom 2 for any context $C \in \mathcal{C}$, there is defined the set of probabilities:

$$\{\mathbf{P}(a = x|C) : a \in \mathcal{O}\}.$$

We complete this probabilistic data for the context C by contextual probabilities with respect to the contexts C_y corresponding to the selections $[b = y]$ for all observables $b \in \mathcal{O}$. The corresponding collection of data $D(\mathcal{O}, C)$ consists of contextual probabilities:

$$\mathbf{P}(a = x|C), \mathbf{P}(b = y|C), \mathbf{P}(a = x|C_y), \mathbf{P}(b = y|C_x), \dots,$$

where $a, b, \dots \in \mathcal{O}$. Finally, we denote the family of probabilistic data $D(\mathcal{O}, C)$ for all contexts $C \in \mathcal{C}$ by the symbol $\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{C}) (\equiv \cup_{C \in \mathcal{C}} D(\mathcal{O}, C))$.

Definition 1. (Växjö Model) *An observational contextual statistical model of reality is a triple*

$$M = (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{C})) \tag{1}$$

where \mathcal{C} is a set of contexts and \mathcal{O} is a set of observables which satisfy to axioms 1, 2, and $\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{C})$ is probabilistic data about contexts \mathcal{C} obtained with the aid of observables belonging \mathcal{O} .

We call observables belonging the set $\mathcal{O} \equiv \mathcal{O}(M)$ *reference of observables*. Inside of a model M observables belonging to the set \mathcal{O} give the only possible references about a context $C \in \mathcal{C}$.

4 Representation of Incomplete Information

Probabilities $\mathbf{P}(b = y|C)$ are interpreted as *contextual (conditional) probabilities*. We emphasize that we consider conditioning not with respect to *events* as

it is typically done in classical probability [20], but conditioning with respect to contexts – complexes of (e.g., physical, biological, social, mental, genetic, economic, or financial) conditions. This is the crucial point.

On the set of all events one can always introduce the structure of the *Boolean algebra* (or more general σ -algebra). In particular, for any two events A and B their set-theoretic intersection $A \cap B$ is well defined and it determines a new event: the simultaneous occurrence of the events A and B .

In contrast to such an event-conditioning picture, if one have two contexts, e.g., complexes of physical conditions C_1 and C_2 and if even it is possible to create the set-theoretic representation of contexts (as some collections of physical parameters), then, nevertheless, their set-theoretic intersection $C_1 \cap C_2$ (although it is well defined mathematically) need not correspond to any physically meaningful context. Physical contexts were taken just as examples. The same is valid for social, mental, economic, genetic and any other type of contexts.

Therefore even if for some model M we can describe contexts in the set-theoretic framework, there are no reasons to assume that the collection of all contexts \mathcal{C} should form a σ -algebra (Boolean algebra). This is the main difference from the classical (noncontextual) probability theory [20].

One can consider the same problem from another perspective. Suppose that we have some set of parameters Ω (e.g., physical, or social, or mental). We also assume that contexts are represented by some subsets of Ω . We consider two levels of description. At the first level a lot of information is available. There is a large set of contexts, we can even assume that they form a σ -algebra of subsets \mathcal{F} . We call them the first level contexts. There is a large number of observables at the first level, say the set of all possible random variables $\xi : \Omega \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$ (here \mathbf{R} is the real line). By introducing on \mathcal{F} a probability measure \mathbf{P} we obtain the classical Kolmogorov probability model $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbf{P})$, see [20]. This is the end of the classical story about the probabilistic description of reality. Such a model is used e.g. in classical statistical physics.

We point out that any Kolmogorov probability model induces a Văxjö model in such a way: a) contexts are given by all sets $C \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $\mathbf{P}(C) \neq 0$; b) the set of observables coincides with the set of all possible random variables; c) contextual probabilities are defined as Kolmogorovian conditional probabilities, i.e., by the Bayes formula: $\mathbf{P}(a = x|C) = \mathbf{P}(\omega \in C : a(\omega) = x)/\mathbf{P}(C)$. This is the Văxjö model for the first level of description.

Consider now the second level of description. Here we can obtain a *non-Kolmogorovian Văxjö model*. At this level only a part of information about the first level Kolmogorovian model $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbf{P})$ can be obtained through a special family of observables \mathcal{O} which correspond to a special subset of the set of all random variables of the Kolmogorov model $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbf{P})$ at the first level of description. Roughly speaking not all contexts of the first level, \mathcal{F} can be “visible” at the second level. There is no sufficiently many observables “to see” all contexts of the first level – elements of the Kolmogorov σ -algebra \mathcal{F} . Thus we should cut off this σ -algebra \mathcal{F} and obtain a smaller family, say \mathcal{C} , of visible contexts. Thus some Văxjö models (those permitting a set-theoretic representation) can appear starting with the purely classical Kolmogorov probabilistic framework,

ω_1	ω_3
ω_2	ω_4

Figure 1: The first level (complete) description.

as a consequence of ignorance of information. If not all information is available, so we cannot use the first level (classical) description, then we, nevertheless, can proceed with the second level contextual description.

We shall see that starting with some Văxjö models we can obtain the quantum-like calculus of probabilities in the complex Hilbert space. Thus in the opposition to a rather common opinion, we can derive a *quantum-like description for ordinary macroscopic systems* as the results of using of an incomplete representation. This opens great possibilities in application of quantum-like models outside the micro-world. In particular, in cognitive science we need not consider composing of the brain from quantum particles to come to the quantum-like model.

Example 1. (Firefly in the box) Let us consider a box which is divided into four sub-boxes. These small boxes which are denoted by $\omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3, \omega_4$ provides the the first level of description. We consider a Kolmogorov probability space: $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3, \omega_4\}$, the algebra of all finite subsets \mathcal{F} of Ω and a probability measure determined by probabilities $\mathbf{P}(\omega_j) = p_j$, where $0 < p_j < 1, p_1 + \dots + p_4 = 1$. We remark that in our interpretation it is more natural to consider elements of Ω as *elementary parameters*, and not as *elementary events* (as it was done by Kolmogorov).

We now consider two different disjoint partitions of the set Ω :

$$A_1 = \{\omega_1, \omega_2\}, A_2 = \{\omega_3, \omega_4\},$$

$$B_1 = \{\omega_1, \omega_4\}, B_2 = \{\omega_2, \omega_3\}.$$

We can obtain such partitions by dividing the box: a) into two equal parts by the vertical line: the left-hand part gives A_1 and the right-hand part A_2 ; b) into two equal parts by the horizontal line: the top part gives B_1 and the bottom part B_2 .

We introduce two random variables corresponding to these partitions: $\xi_a(\omega) = x_i$, if $\omega \in A_i$ and $\xi_b(\omega) = y_i$ if $\omega \in B_i$. Suppose now that we are able to measure only these two variables, denote the corresponding observables by the symbols a and b . We project the Kolmogorov model under consideration to a non-Kolmogorovian Văxjö model by using the observables a and b – the second level of description. At this level the set of observables $\mathcal{O} = \{a, b\}$ and the natural set of contexts $\mathcal{C} : \Omega, A_1, A_2, B_1, B_2, C_1 = \{\omega_1, \omega_3\}, C_2 = \{\omega_2, \omega_4\}$ and all unions of these sets. Here “natural” has the meaning permitting a quantum-like representation (see further considerations). Roughly speaking contexts of the




Figure 2: The second level description: the a-observable.




Figure 3: The second level description: the b-observable

second level of description should be large enough to “be visible” with the aid of observables a and b .

Intersections of these sets need not belong to the system of contexts (nor complements of these sets). Thus the Boolean structure of the original first level description disappeared, but, nevertheless, it is present in the latent form. Point-sets $\{\omega_j\}$ are not “visible” at this level of description. For example, the random variable

$$\eta(\omega_j) = \gamma_j, j = 1, \dots, 4, \gamma_i \neq \gamma_j, i \neq j,$$

is not an observable at the second level.

Such a model was discussed from positions of quantum logic, see, e.g., [6]. There can be provided a nice interpretation of these two levels of description. Let us consider a firefly in the box. It can fly everywhere in this box. Its locations are described by the uniform probability distribution \mathbf{P} (on the σ -algebra of Borel subsets of the box). This is the first level of description. Such a description can be realized if the box were done from glass or if at every point of the box there were a light detector. All Kolmogorov random variables can be considered as observables.

Now we consider the situation when there are only two possibilities to observe the firefly in the box:

- 1) to open a small window at a point a which is located in such a way (the bold dot in the middle of the bottom side of the box) that it is possible to determine only either the firefly is in the section A_1 or in the section A_2 of the box;
- 2) to open a small window at a point b which is located in such a way (the bold dot in the middle of the right-hand side of the box) that it is possible to determine only either the firefly is in the section B_1 or in the section B_2 of the box.

In the first case I can determine in which part, A_1 or A_2 , the firefly is located.

In the second case I also can only determine in which part, B_1 or B_2 , the firefly is located. But I am not able to look into both windows simultaneously. In such a situation the observables a and b are the only source of information about the firefly (reference observables). The Kolmogorov description is meaningless (although it is incorporated in the model in the latent form). Can one apply a quantum-like description, namely, represent contexts by complex probability amplitudes? The answer is to be positive. The set of contexts that permit the quantum-like representation consists of all subsets C such that $\mathbf{P}(A_i|C) > 0$ and $\mathbf{P}(B_i|C) > 0, i = 1, 2$ (i.e., for sufficiently large contexts). We have seen that the Boolean structure disappeared as a consequence of ignorance of information.

Finally, we emphasize again that the Vaxjo model is essentially more general. The set-theoretic representation need not exist at all.

5 Quantum Projection of Boolean Logic

Typically the absence of the Boolean structure on the set of quantum propositions is considered as the violation of laws of classical logic, e.g., in quantum mechanics [15]. In our approach classical logic is not violated, it is present in the latent form. However, we are not able to use it, because we do not have complete information. Thus quantum-like logic is a kind of projection of classical logic. The impossibility of operation with complete information about a system is not always a disadvantages. Processing of incomplete set of information has the evident advantage comparing with “classical Boolean” complete information processing – the great saving of computing resources and increasing of the speed of computation. However, the Boolean structure cannot be violated in an arbitrary way, because in such a case we shall get a chaotic computational process. There should be developed some calculus of consistent ignorance by information. Quantum formalism provides one of such calculi.

Of course, there are no reasons to assume that processing of information through ignoring of its essential part should be rigidly coupled to a special class of physical systems, so called quantum systems. Therefore we prefer to speak about *quantum-like processing of information* that may be performed by various kinds of physical and biological systems. In our approach quantum computer has advantages not because it is based on a special class of physical systems (e.g., electrons or ions), but because there is realized the consistent processing of incomplete information. We prefer to use the terminology *QL-computer* by reserving the “quantum computer” for a special class of QL-computers which are based on quantum physical systems.

One may speculate that some biological systems could develop in the process of evolution the possibility to operate in a consistent way with incomplete information. Such a QL-processing of information implies evident advantages. Hence, it might play an important role in the process of the natural selection. It might be that consciousness is a form of the QL-presentation of information. In such a way we really came back to Whitehead’s analogy between quantum and conscious systems [22].

6 Contextual Interpretation of “Incompatible” Observables

Nowadays the notion of incompatible (complementary) observables is rigidly coupled to *noncommutativity*. In the conventional quantum formalism observables are incompatible iff they are represented by noncommuting self-adjoint operators \hat{a} and $\hat{b} : [\hat{a}, \hat{b}] \neq 0$. As we see, the Växjö model is not from the very beginning coupled to a representation of information in a Hilbert space. Our aim is to generate an analogue (may be not direct) of the notion of incompatible (complementary) observables starting not from the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, but on the basis of the Växjö model, i.e., directly from statistical data.

Why do I dislike the conventional identification of *incompatibility with noncommutativity*? The main reason is that typically the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is identified with it as a physical theory. Therefore the quantum incompatibility represented through noncommutativity is rigidly coupled to the micro-world. (The only possibility to transfer quantum behavior to the macro-world is to consider physical states of the Bose-Einstein condensate type.) We shall see that some Växjö models can be represented as the conventional quantum model in the complex Hilbert space. However, the Växjö model is essentially more general than the quantum model. In particular, some Växjö models can be represented not in the complex, but in hyperbolic Hilbert space (the Hilbert module over the two dimensional Clifford algebra with the generator $j : j^2 = +1$).

Another point is that the terminology – incompatibility – is misleading in our approach. The quantum mechanical meaning of compatibility is the possibility to measure two observables, a and b *simultaneously*. In such a case they are represented by commuting operators. Consequently incompatibility implies the impossibility of simultaneous measurement of a and b . In the Växjö model there is no such a thing as fundamental impossibility of simultaneous measurement. We present the viewpoint that quantum incompatibility is just a consequence of information *supplementarity* of observables a and b . The information which is obtained via a measurement of, e.g., b can be non trivially updated by additional information which is contained in the result of a measurement of a . Roughly speaking if one knows a value of b , say $b = y$, this does not imply knowing the fixed value of a and vice versa, see [16] for details.

We remark that it might be better to use the notion “complementary,” instead of “supplementary.” However, the first one was already reserved by Nils Bohr for the notion which very close to “incompatibility.” In any event Bohr’s complementarity implies *mutual exclusivity* that was not the point of our considerations.

Supplementary processes take place not only in physical micro-systems. For example, in the brain there are present supplementary mental processes. Therefore the brain is a (macroscopic) QL-system. Similar supplementary processes take place in economy and in particular at financial market. There one could

also use quantum-like descriptions [8]. But the essence of the quantum-like descriptions is not the representation of information in the complex Hilbert space, but incomplete (projection-type) representations of information. It seems that the Vaxjo model provides a rather general description of such representations.

We introduce a notion of supplementary which will produce in some cases the quantum-like representation of observables by noncommuting operators, but which is not identical to incompatibility (in the sense of impossibility of simultaneous observations) nor complementarity (in the sense of mutual exclusivity).

Definition 2. *Let $a, b \in \mathcal{O}$. The observable a is said to be supplementary to the observable b if*

$$p^{a|b}(x|y) \neq 0, \quad (2)$$

for all $x \in X_a, y \in X_b$.

Let $a = x_1, x_2$ and $b = y_1, y_2$ be two dichotomous observables. In this case (2) is equivalent to the condition:

$$p^{a|b}(x|y) \neq 1, \quad (3)$$

for all $x \in X_a, y \in X_b$. Thus by knowing the result $b = y$ of the b -observation we are not able to make the definite prediction about the result of the a -observation.

Suppose now that (3) is violated (i.e., a is not supplementary to b), for example:

$$p^{a|b}(x_1|y_1) = 1, \quad (4)$$

and, hence, $p^{a|b}(x_2|y_1) = 0$. Here the result $b = y_1$ determines the result $a = x_1$.

In future we shall consider a special class of Vaxjo models in that the matrix of transition probabilities $\mathbf{P}^{a|b} = (p^{a|b}(x_i|y_j))_{i,j=1}^2$ is *double stochastic*: $p^{a|b}(x_1|y_1) + p^{a|b}(x_1|y_2) = 1; p^{a|b}(x_2|y_1) + p^{a|b}(x_2|y_2) = 1$. In such a case the condition (4) implies that

$$p^{a|b}(x_2|y_2) = 1, \quad (5)$$

and, hence, $p^{a|b}(x_1|y_2) = 0$. Thus also the result $b = y_2$ determines the result $a = x_2$.

We point out that for models with double stochastic matrix

$$\mathbf{P}^{a|b} = (p^{a|b}(x_i|y_j))_{i,j=1}^2$$

the relation of supplementary is symmetric! In general it is not the case. It can happen that a is supplementary to b : each a -measurement gives us additional information updating information obtained in a preceding measurement of b (for any result $b = y$). But b can be non-supplementary to a .

Let us now come back to Example 1. The observables a and b are supplementary in our meaning. Consider now the classical Kolmogorov model and suppose that we are able to measure not only the random variables ξ_a and ξ_b – observables a and b , but also the random variable η . We denote the corresponding observable by d . The pairs of observables (d, a) and (d, b) are non-supplementary:

$$p^{a|d}(x_1|\gamma_i) = 0, \quad i = 3, 4; \quad p^{a|d}(x_2|\gamma_i) = 0, \quad i = 1, 2,$$

and, hence,

$$p^{a|d}(x_1|\gamma_i) = 1, \quad i = 1, 2; \quad p^{a|d}(x_2|\gamma_i) = 1, \quad i = 3, 4.$$

Thus if one knows, e.g., that $d = \gamma_1$ then it is definitely that $a = x_1$ and so on.

7 A Statistical Test to Find Quantum-like Structure

We consider examples of cognitive contexts:

1). C can be some selection procedure that is used to select a special group S_C of people or animals. Such a context is represented by this group S_C (so this is an ensemble of cognitive systems). For example, we select a group $S_{\text{prof.math.}}$ of professors of mathematics (and then ask questions a or (and) b or give corresponding tasks). We can select a group of people of some age. We can select a group of people having a “special mental state”: for example, people in love or hungry people (and then ask questions or give tasks).

2). C can be a learning procedure that is used to create some special group of people or animals. For example, rats can be trained to react to special stimulus.

We can also consider *social contexts*. For example, social classes: proletariat-context, bourgeois-context; or war-context, revolution-context, context of economic depression, poverty-context, and so on. Thus our model can be used in social and political sciences (and even in history). We can try to find quantum-like statistical data in these sciences.

We describe a mental interference experiment.

Let $a = x_1, x_2$ and $b = y_1, y_2$ be two dichotomous mental observables: $x_1=\text{yes}, x_2=\text{no}, y_1=\text{yes}, y_2=\text{no}$. We set $X \equiv X_a = \{x_1, x_2\}, Y \equiv X_b = \{y_1, y_2\}$ (“spectra” of observables a and b). Observables can be two different questions or two different types of cognitive tasks. We use these two fixed reference observables for probabilistic representation of cognitive contextual reality given by C .

We perform observations of a under the complex of cognitive conditions C :

$$p^a(x) = \frac{\text{the number of results } a = x}{\text{the total number of observations}}.$$

So $p^a(x)$ is the probability to get the result x for observation of the a under the complex of cognitive conditions C . In the same way we find probabilities $p^b(y)$ for the b -observation under the same cognitive context C .

As was supposed in axiom 1, cognitive contexts C_y can be created corresponding to selections with respect to fixed values of the b -observable. The context C_y (for fixed $y \in Y$) can be characterized in the following way. By measuring the b -observable under the cognitive context C_y we shall obtain the answer $b = y$ with probability one. We perform now the a -measurements under cognitive contexts C_y for $y = y_1, y_2$, and find the probabilities:

$$p^{a|b}(x|y) = \frac{\text{number of the result } a = x \text{ for context } C_y}{\text{number of all observations for context } C_y}$$

where $x \in X, y \in Y$. For example, by using the ensemble approach to probability we have that the probability $p^{a|b}(x_1|y_2)$ is obtained as the frequency of the answer $a = x_1 = \text{yes}$ in the ensemble of cognitive system that have already answered $b = y_2 = \text{no}$. Thus we first select a sub-ensemble of cognitive systems who replies *no* to the b -question, $C_{b=\text{no}}$. Then we ask systems belonging to $C_{b=\text{no}}$ the a -question.

It is assumed (and this is a very natural assumption) that a cognitive system is “responsible for her (his) answers.” Suppose that a system τ has answered $b = y_2 = \text{no}$. If we ask τ again the same question b we shall get the same answer $b = y_2 = \text{no}$. This is nothing else than *the mental form of the von Neumann projection postulate*: the second measurement of the same observable, performed immediately after the first one, will yield the same value of the observable).

Classical probability theory tells us that all these probabilities have to be connected by the so called *formula of total probability*:

$$p^a(x) = p^b(y_1)p^{a|b}(x|y_1) + p^b(y_2)p^{a|b}(x|y_2), \quad x \in X.$$

However, if the theory is quantum-like, then we should obtain [7] the formula of total probability with an interference term:

$$p^a(x) = p^b(y_1)p^{a|b}(x|y_1) + p^b(y_2)p^{a|b}(x|y_2) + 2\lambda(a = x|b, C)\sqrt{p^b(y_1)p^{a|b}(x|y_1)p^b(y_2)p^{a|b}(x|y_2)}, \quad (6)$$

where the coefficient of supplementarity (the coefficient of interference) is given by

$$\lambda(a = x|b, C) = \frac{p^a(x) - p^b(y_1)p^{a|b}(x|y_1) - p^b(y_2)p^{a|b}(x|y_2)}{2\sqrt{p^b(y_1)p^{a|b}(x|y_1)p^b(y_2)p^{a|b}(x|y_2)}} \quad (7)$$

This formula holds true for *supplementary observables*. To prove its validity, it is sufficient to put the expression for $\lambda(a = x|b, C)$, see (7), into (6). In the quantum-like statistical test for a cognitive context C we calculate

$$\bar{\lambda}(a = x|b, C) = \frac{\bar{p}^a(x) - \bar{p}^b(y_1)\bar{p}^{a|b}(x|y_1) - \bar{p}^b(y_2)\bar{p}^{a|b}(x|y_2)}{2\sqrt{\bar{p}^b(y_1)\bar{p}^{a|b}(x|y_1)\bar{p}^b(y_2)\bar{p}^{a|b}(x|y_2)}},$$

where the symbol \bar{p} is used for empirical probabilities – frequencies. An empirical situation with $\lambda(a = x|b, C) \neq 0$ would yield evidence for quantum-like behaviour of cognitive systems. In this case, starting with (experimentally calculated) coefficient of interference $\lambda(a = x|b, C)$ we can proceed either to the conventional Hilbert space formalism (if this coefficient is bounded by 1) or to so called hyperbolic Hilbert space formalism (if this coefficient is larger than 1). In the first case the coefficient of interference can be represented in the trigonometric form $\lambda(a = x|b, C) = \cos \theta(x)$, Here $\theta(x) \equiv \theta(a = x|b, C)$ is the phase of the a -interference between cognitive contexts C and $C_y, y \in Y$. In this case we have the conventional formula of total probability with the interference term:

$$p^a(x) = p^b(y_1)p^{a|b}(x|y_1) + p^b(y_2)p^{a|b}(x|y_2) + 2\lambda(a = x|b, C)\sqrt{p^b(y_1)p^{a|b}(x|y_1)p^b(y_2)p^{a|b}(x|y_2)} \quad (8)$$

$$+2 \cos \theta(x) \sqrt{p^b(y_1)p^{a|b}(x|y_1)p^b(y_2)p^{a|b}(x|y_2)}.$$

In principle, it could be derived in the conventional Hilbert space formalism. But we chosen the inverse way. Starting with (8) we could introduce a “mental wave function” $\psi \equiv \psi_C$ (or pure quantum-like mental state) belonging to this Hilbert space. We recall that in our approach a mental wave function ψ is just a representation of a cognitive context C by a complex probability amplitude. The latter provides a Hilbert representation of statistical data about context which can be obtained with the help of two fixed observables (reference observables).

8 The Wave Function Representation of Contexts

In this section we shall present an algorithm for representation of a context (in fact, probabilistic data on this context) by a complex probability amplitude. This QL representation algorithm (QLRA) was created by the author [7]. It can be interpreted as a consistent projection of classical probabilistic description (the complete one) onto QL probabilistic description (the incomplete one).

Let C be a context. We consider only contexts with trigonometric interference for *supplementary observables* a and b – the reference observables for coming QL representation of contexts. The collection of all trigonometric contexts, i.e., contexts having the coefficients of supplementarity (with respect to two fixed observables a and b) bounded by one, is denoted by the symbol $C^{\text{tr}} \equiv C_{a|b}^{\text{tr}}$. We again point out to the dependence of the notion of a trigonometric context on the choice of reference observables.

We now point directly to dependence of probabilities on contexts by using the context lower index C . The interference formula of total probability (6) can be written in the following form:

$$p_C^a(x) = \sum_{y \in X_b} p_C^b(y)p^{a|b}(x|y) + 2 \cos \theta_C(x) \sqrt{\prod_{y \in Y} p_C^b(y)p^{a|b}(x|y)} \quad (9)$$

By using the elementary formula:

$$D = A + B + 2\sqrt{AB} \cos \theta = |\sqrt{A} + e^{i\theta} \sqrt{B}|^2,$$

for $A, B > 0, \theta \in [0, 2\pi]$, we can represent the probability $p_C^a(x)$ as the square of the complex amplitude (Born’s rule):

$$p_C^a(x) = |\varphi_C(x)|^2, \quad (10)$$

where a complex probability amplitude is defined by

$$\varphi(x) \equiv \varphi_C(x) = \sqrt{p_C^b(y_1)p^{a|b}(x|y_1)} + e^{i\theta_C(x)} \sqrt{p_C^b(y_2)p^{a|b}(x|y_2)}. \quad (11)$$

We denote the space of functions: $\varphi : X_a \rightarrow \mathbf{C}$, where \mathbf{C} is the field of complex numbers, by the symbol $\Phi = \Phi(X_a, \mathbf{C})$. Since $X_a = \{x_1, x_2\}$, the Φ is the two dimensional complex linear space. By using the representation (11) we construct the map

$$J^{a|b} : C^{\text{tr}} \rightarrow \Phi(X, \mathbf{C})$$

which maps contexts (complexes of, e.g., physical or social conditions) into complex amplitudes. This map realizes QLRA.

The representation (10) of probability is nothing other than the famous **Born rule**. The complex amplitude $\varphi_C(x)$ can be called a **wave function** of the complex of physical conditions (context) C or a (pure) *state*. We set $e_x^a(\cdot) = \delta(x - \cdot)$. The Born's rule for complex amplitudes (10) can be rewritten in the following form:

$$p_C^a(x) = |\langle \varphi_C, e_x^a \rangle|^2, \quad (12)$$

where the scalar product in the space $\Phi(X, C)$ is defined by the standard formula:

$$(\varphi, \psi) = \sum_{x \in X_a} \varphi(x) \bar{\psi}(x). \quad (13)$$

The system of functions $\{e_x^a\}_{x \in X_a}$ is an orthonormal basis in the Hilbert space

$$\mathbf{H} = (\Phi, (\cdot, \cdot)).$$

Let X_a be a subset of the real line. By using the Hilbert space representation of the Born's rule we obtain the Hilbert space representation of the expectation of the reference observable a :

$$E(a|C) = \sum_{x \in X_a} x |\varphi_C(x)|^2 = \sum_{x \in X_a} x (\varphi_C, e_x^a) \overline{(\varphi_C, e_x^a)} = (\hat{a} \varphi_C, \varphi_C),$$

where the (self-adjoint) operator $\hat{a} : \mathbf{H} \rightarrow \mathbf{H}$ is determined by its eigenvectors: $\hat{a} e_x^a = x e_x^a, x \in X_a$. This is the multiplication operator in the space of complex functions $\Phi(X, \mathbf{C})$:

$$\hat{a} \varphi(x) = x \varphi(x).$$

It is natural to represent this reference observable (in the Hilbert space model) by the operator \hat{a} .

We would like to have Born's rule not only for the a -observable, but also for the b -observable.

$$p_C^b(y) = |(\varphi, e_y^b)|^2, y \in X_b.$$

Thus both reference observables would be represented by self-adjoint operators determined by bases $\{e_x^a\}, \{e_y^b\}$, respectively.

How can we define the basis $\{e_y^b\}$ corresponding to the b -observable? Such a basis can be found starting with interference of probabilities. We set $u_j^b = \sqrt{p_C^b(y_j)}, p_{ij} = p^{a|b}(x_j|y_i), u_{ij} = \sqrt{p_{ij}}, \theta_j = \theta_C(x_j)$. We have:

$$\varphi = u_1^b e_1^b + u_2^b e_2^b, \quad (14)$$

where

$$e_1^b = (u_{11}, u_{12}), \quad e_2^b = (e^{i\theta_1}u_{21}, e^{i\theta_2}u_{22}) \quad (15)$$

We consider the *matrix of transition probabilities* $\mathbf{P}^{a|b} = (p_{ij})$. It is always a *stochastic matrix*: $p_{i1} + p_{i2} = 1, i = 1, 2$). We remind that a matrix is called *double stochastic* if it is stochastic and, moreover, $p_{1j} + p_{2j} = 1, j = 1, 2$. The system $\{e_i^b\}$ is an orthonormal basis iff the matrix $\mathbf{P}^{a|b}$ is double stochastic and probabilistic phases satisfy the constraint: $\theta_2 - \theta_1 = \pi \bmod 2\pi$, see [7] for details.

It will be always supposed that the matrix of transition probabilities $\mathbf{P}^{a|b}$ is double stochastic. In this case the b -observable is represented by the operator \hat{b} which is diagonal (with eigenvalues y_i) in the basis $\{e_i^b\}$. The Kolmogorovian conditional average of the random variable b coincides with the quantum Hilbert space average:

$$E(b|C) = \sum_{y \in X_b} y p_C^b(y) = (\hat{b}\phi_C, \phi_C), \quad C \in C^{\text{tr}}.$$

9 Brain as a System Performing a Quantum-like Processing of Information

The brain is a huge information system that contains millions of elementary mental states. It could not “recognize” (or “feel”) all those states at each instant of time t . Our fundamental hypothesis is that the brain is able to create the QL-representations of mind. At each instant of time t the brain creates the QL-representation of its mental context C based on two supplementary mental (self-)observables a and b . Here $a = (a_1, \dots, a_n)$ and $b = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$ can be very long vectors of compatible (non-supplementary) dichotomous observables. The reference observables a and b can be chosen (by the brain) in different ways at different instances of time. Such a change of the reference observables is known in cognitive sciences as a *change of representation*.

A mental context C in the $a|b$ -representation is described by the mental wave function ψ_C . We can speculate that the brain has the ability to feel this mental field as a distribution on the space X . This distribution is given by the norm-squared of the mental wave function: $|\psi_C(x)|^2$.

In such a model it might be supposed that the state of our consciousness is represented by the mental wave function ψ_C . The crucial point is that in this model consciousness is created through neglecting an essential volume of information contained in subconsciousness. Of course, this is not just a random loss of information. Information is selected through QLRA, see (11): a mental context C is projected onto the complex probability amplitude ψ_C .

The (classical) mental state of sub-consciousness evolves with time $C \rightarrow C(t)$. This dynamics induces dynamics of the mental wave function $\psi(t) = \psi_{C(t)}$ in the complex Hilbert space.

Further development of our approach (which we are not able to present here) induces the following model of brain's functioning [9]:

The brain is able to create the QL-representation of mental contexts, $C \rightarrow \psi_C$ (by using the algorithm based on the formula of total probability with interference).

10 Brain as Quantum-like Computer

The ability of the brain to create the QL-representation of mental contexts induces functioning of the brain as a quantum-like computer.

The brain performs computation-thinking by using algorithms of quantum computing in the complex Hilbert space of mental QL-states.

We emphasize that in our approach the brain is not quantum computer, but a QL-computer. On one hand, a QL-computer works totally in accordance with the mathematical theory of quantum computations (so by using quantum algorithms). On the other hand, it is not based on superposition of individual mental states. The complex amplitude ψ_C representing a mental context C is a special probabilistic representation of information states of the huge neuronal ensemble. In particular, the brain is a *macroscopic* QL-computer. Thus the QL-parallelism (in the opposite to conventional quantum parallelism) has a natural realistic base. This is real parallelism in the working of millions of neurons. The crucial point is the way in which this classical parallelism is projected onto dynamics of QL-states. The QL-brain is able to solve *NP*-problems. But there is nothing mysterious in this ability: an exponentially increasing number of operations is performed through involving of an exponentially increasing number of neurons.

We point out that by coupling QL-parallelism to working of neurons we started to present a particular ontic model for QL-computations. We shall discuss it in more detail. Observables a and b are self-observations of the brain. They can be represented as functions of the internal state of brain ω . Here ω is a parameter of huge dimension describing states of all neurons in the brain: $\omega = (\omega_1, \omega_2, \dots, \omega_N) :$

$$a = a(\omega), b = b(\omega).$$

The brain is not interested in concrete values of the reference observables at fixed instances of time. The brain finds the contextual probability distributions $p_C^a(x)$ and $p_C^b(y)$ and creates the mental QL-state $\psi_C(x)$, see QLRA – (11). Then it works with the mental wave function $\psi_C(x)$ by using algorithms of quantum computing.

11 Two Time Scales as the Basis of the QL-representation of Information

The crucial problem is to find a mechanism for producing contextual probabilities. We think that they are frequency probabilities that are created in the brain in the following way. There are two scales of time: a) internal scale, τ -time; b)

QL-scale, t -time. The internal scale is *finer than the QL-scale*. Each instant of QL-time t corresponds to an interval Δ of internal time τ . We might identify the QL-time with mental (psychological) time and the internal time with physical time. We shall also use the terminology: pre-cognitive time-scale - τ and cognitive time-scale - t .

During the interval Δ of internal time the brain collects statistical data for self-observations of a and b . The internal state ω of the brain evolves as

$$\omega = \omega(\tau, \omega_0).$$

This is a classical dynamics (which can be described by a stochastic differential equation).

At each instance of internal time τ there are performed nondisturbative self-measurements of a and b . These are realistic measurements: the brain gets values $a(\omega(\tau, \omega_0))$, $b(\omega(\tau, \omega_0))$. By finding frequencies of realization of fixed values for $a(\omega(\tau, \omega_0))$ and $b(\omega(\tau, \omega_0))$ during the interval Δ of internal time, the brain obtains the frequency probabilities $p_C^a(x)$ and $p_C^b(y)$. These probabilities are related to the instant of QL-time time t corresponding to the interval of internal time Δ : $p_C^a(t, x)$ and $p_C^b(t, y)$. We remark that in these probabilities the brain encodes huge amount of information – millions of mental “micro-events” which happen during the interval Δ . But the brain is not interested in all those individual events. (It would be too disturbing and too irrational to take into account all those fluctuations of mind.) It takes into account only the integral result of such a *pre-cognitive activity* (which was performed at the pre-cognitive time scale).

For example, the mental observables a and b can be measurements over different domains of brain. It is supposed that the brain can “feel” probabilities (frequencies) $p_C^a(x)$ and $p_C^b(y)$, but not able to “feel” the simultaneous probability distribution $p_C(x, y) = P(a = x, b = y|C)$.

This is not the problem of mathematical existence of such a distribution. This is the problem of integration of statistics of observations from different domains of the brain. By using the QL-representation based only on probabilities $p_C^a(x)$ and $p_C^b(y)$ the brain could be able to escape integration of information about *individual self-observations* of variables a and b related to spatially separated domains of brain. The brain need not couple these domains at each instant of internal (pre-cognitive time) time τ . It couples them only once in the interval Δ through the contextual probabilities $p_C^a(x)$ and $p_C^b(y)$. This induces the huge saving of time and increasing of speed of processing of mental information.

One of fundamental consequences for cognitive science is that our mental images have the probabilistic structure. They are products of transition from an extremely fine pre-cognitive time scale to a rather rough cognitive time scale.

Finally, we remark that a similar time scaling approach was developed in [3] for ordinary quantum mechanics. In [3] quantum expectations appear as results of averaging with respect to a prequantum time scale. There was presented an extended discussion of possible choices of quantum and prequantum time scales.

We can discuss the same problem in the cognitive framework. We may try to estimate the time scale parameter Δ of the neural QL-coding. There are strong

experimental evidences, see, e.g., [21], that a moment in psychological time correlates with ≈ 100 ms of physical time for neural activity. In such a model the basic assumption is that the physical time required for the transmission of information over synapses is somehow neglected in the psychological time. The time (≈ 100 ms) required for the transmission of information from retina to the inferiotemporal cortex (IT) through the primary visual cortex (V1) is mapped to a moment of psychological time. It might be that by using

$$\Delta \approx 100\text{ms}$$

we shall get the right scale of the QL-coding.

However, it seems that the situation is essentially more complicated. There are experimental evidences that the temporal structure of neural functioning is not homogeneous. The time required for completion of color information in V4 (≈ 60 ms) is shorter than the time for the completion of shape analysis in IT (≈ 100 ms). In particular it is predicted that there will be under certain conditions a rivalry between color and form perception. This rivalry in time is one of manifestations of complex level temporal structure of brain. There may exist various pairs of scales inducing the QL-representations of information.

12 The Hilbert Space Projection of Contextual Probabilistic Dynamics

Let us assume that the reference observables a and b evolve with time: $x = x(t)$, $y = y(t)$, where $x(t_0) = a$ and $y(t_0) = b$. To simplify considerations, we consider evolutions which do not change ranges of values of the reference observables: $X_a = \{x_1, x_2\}$ and $X_b = \{y_1, y_2\}$ do not depend on time. Thus, for any t , $x(t) \in X_a$ and $y = y(t) \in X_b$.

In particular, we can consider the very special case when the dynamical reference observables correspond to classical stochastic processes: $x(t, \omega)$, $y(t, \omega)$, where $x(t_0, \omega) = a(\omega)$ and $y(t_0, \omega) = b(\omega)$. Under the previous assumption these are random walks with two-points state spaces X_a and X_b . However, we recall that in general we do not assume the existence of Kolmogorov measure-theoretic representation.

Since our main aim is the contextual probabilistic realistic reconstruction of QM, we should restrict our considerations to evolutions with the trigonometric interference. We proceed under the following assumption:

(CTRB) (Conservation of trigonometric behavior) *The set of trigonometric contexts does not depend on time: $C_{x(t)|y(t)}^{\text{tr}} = C_{x(t_0)|y(t_0)}^{\text{tr}} = C_{a|b}^{\text{tr}}$.*

By (CTRB) if a context $C \in C_{x(t_0)|y(t_0)}^{\text{tr}}$, i.e., at the initial instant of time the coefficients of statistical disturbance $|\lambda(x(t_0) = x|y(t_0), C)| \leq 1$, then the coefficients $\lambda(x(t) = x|y(t), C)$ will always fluctuate in the segment $[0, 1]$.⁴

⁴Of course, there can be considered more general dynamics in which the trigonometric probabilistic behaviour can be transformed into the hyperbolic one and vice versa.

For each instant of time t , we can use QLRA, see (11): a context C can be represented by a complex probability amplitude:

$$\begin{aligned}\varphi(t, x) \equiv \varphi_C^{x(t)|y(t)}(x) &= \sqrt{p_C^{y(t)}(y_1)p^{x(t)|y(t)}(x|y_1)} \\ &+ e^{i\theta_C^{x(t)|y(t)}(x)} \sqrt{p_C^{y(t)}(y_2)p^{x(t)|y(t)}(x|y_2)}.\end{aligned}$$

We remark that the observable $y(t)$ is represented by the self-adjoint operator $\hat{y}(t)$ defined by its with eigenvectors:

$$e_{1t}^b = \begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{p_t(x_1|y_1)} \\ \sqrt{p_t(x_2|y_1)} \end{pmatrix} e_{2t}^b = e^{i\theta_C(t)} \begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{p_t(x_1|y_2)} \\ -\sqrt{p_t(x_2|y_1)} \end{pmatrix}$$

where $p_t(x|y) = p^{x(t)|y(t)}(x|y)$, $\theta_C(t) = \theta_C^{x(t)|y(t)}(x_1)$ and where we set $e_{jt}^b \equiv e_j^{y(t)}$. We recall that $\theta_C^{x(t)|y(t)}(x_2) = \theta_C^{x(t)|y(t)}(x_1) + \pi$, since the matrix of transition probabilities is assumed to be double stochastic for all instances of time.

We shall describe dynamics of the wave function $\varphi(t, x)$ starting with following assumptions (CP) and (CTP). Then these assumptions will be completed by the set (a)-(b) of mathematical assumptions which will imply the conventional Schrödinger evolution.

(CP)(Conservation of b -probabilities) *The probability distribution of the b -observable is preserved in process of evolution: $p_C^{y(t)}(y) = p_C^{b(t_0)}(y)$, $y \in X_b$, for any context $C \in C_{a(t_0)|b(t_0)}^{\text{tr}}$. This statistical conservation of the b -quantity will have very important dynamical consequences. We also assume that the law of conservation of transition probabilities holds:*

(CTP) (Conservation of transition probabilities) *Probabilities $p_t(x|y)$ are conserved in the process of evolution: $p_t(x|y) = p_{t_0}(x|y) \equiv p(x|y)$.*

Under the latter assumption we have:

$$e_{1t}^b \equiv e_{1t_0}^b, \quad e_{2t}^b = e^{i[\theta_C(t) - \theta_C(t_0)]} e_{2t_0}^b.$$

For such an evolution of the $y(t)$ -basis $\hat{b}(t) = \hat{b}(t_0) = \hat{b}$. Hence the whole stochastic process $y(t, \omega)$ is represented by one fixed self-adjoint operator \hat{b} . This is a good illustration of incomplete QL representation of information.

Thus under assumptions (CTRB), (CP) and (CTP) we have:

$$\varphi(t) = u_1^b e_{1t}^b + u_2^b e_{2t}^b = u_1^b e_{1t_0}^b + e^{i\xi_C(t, t_0)} u_2^b e_{2t_0}^b,$$

where $u_j^b = \sqrt{p_C^{b(t_0)}(y_j)}$, $j = 1, 2$, and $\xi_C(t, t_0) = \theta_C(t) - \theta_C(t_0)$. Let us consider the unitary operator $\hat{U}(t, t_0) : \mathbf{H} \rightarrow \mathbf{H}$ defined by this transformation of basis: $e_{t_0}^b \rightarrow e_t^b$. In the basis $e_{t_0}^b = \{e_{1t_0}^b, e_{2t_0}^b\}$ the $\hat{U}(t, t_0)$ can be represented by the matrix:

$$\hat{U}(t, t_0) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & e^{i\xi_C(t, t_0)} \end{pmatrix}.$$

We obtained the following dynamics in the Hilbert space \mathbf{H} :

$$\varphi(t) = \hat{U}(t, t_0)\varphi(t_0). \quad (16)$$

This dynamics looks very similar to the Schrödinger dynamics in the Hilbert space. However, the dynamics (16) is essentially more general than Schrödinger's dynamics. In fact, the unitary operator $\hat{U}(t, t_0) = \hat{U}(t, t_0, C)$ depends on the context C , i.e., on the initial state $\varphi(t_0) : \hat{U}(t, t_0) \equiv \hat{U}(t, t_0, \varphi(t_0))$. So, in fact, we derived the following dynamical equation: $\varphi(t) = \hat{U}(t, t_0, \varphi_0)\varphi_0$, where, for any φ_0 , $\hat{U}(t, t_0, \varphi_0)$ is a family of unitary operators.

The conditions (CTRB), (CP) and (CTP) are natural from the physical viewpoint (if the b -observable is considered as an analog of energy, see further considerations). But these conditions do not imply that the Hilbert space image of the contextual realistic dynamics is a linear unitary dynamics. *In general the Hilbert space projection of the realistic prequantum dynamics is nonlinear.* To obtain a linear dynamics, we should make the following assumption:

(CI) (Context independence of the increment of the probabilistic phase) *The $\xi_C(t, t_0) = \theta_C(t) - \theta_C(t_0)$ does not depend on C .*

Under this assumption the unitary operator $\hat{U}(t, t_0) = \text{diag}(1, e^{i\xi(t, t_0)})$ does not depend on C . Thus the equation (16) is the equation of the linear unitary evolution. The linear unitary evolution (16) is still essentially more general than the conventional Schrödinger dynamics. To obtain the Schrödinger evolution, we need a few standard mathematical assumptions:

(a). Dynamics is continuous: the map $(t, t_0) \rightarrow \hat{U}(t, t_0)$ is continuous⁵; (b). Dynamics is deterministic; (c). Dynamics is invariant with respect to time-shifts; $\hat{U}(t, t_0)$ depends only on $t - t_0 : \hat{U}(t, t_0) \equiv \hat{U}(t - t_0)$.

The assumption of determinism can be described by the following relation: $\phi(t; t_0, \phi_0) = \phi(t; t_1, \phi(t_1; t_0, \phi_0))$, $t_0 \leq t_1 \leq t$, where $\phi(t; t_0, \phi_0) = \hat{U}(t, t_0)\phi_0$.

It is well known that under the assumptions (a), (b), (c) the family of (linear) unitary operators $\hat{U}(t, t_0)$ corresponds to the one parametric group of unitary operators: $\hat{U}(t) = e^{-\frac{i}{h}\hat{H}t}$, where $\hat{H} : \mathbf{H} \rightarrow \mathbf{H}$ is a self-adjoint operator. Here $h > 0$ is a scaling factor (e.g., the Planck constant). We have: $\hat{H} = \text{diag}(0, E)$, where

$$E = -h \left[\frac{\theta_C(t) - \theta_C(t_0)}{t - t_0} \right].$$

Hence the Schrödinger evolution in the complex Hilbert space corresponds to the contextual probabilistic dynamics with the linear evolution of the probabilistic phase:

$$\theta_C(t) = \theta_C(t_0) - \frac{E}{h}(t - t_0).$$

We, finally, study the very special case when the dynamical reference observables correspond to classical stochastic processes: $x(t, \omega), y(t, \omega)$. This is a special case of the Växjö model: there exist the Kolmogorov representation of contexts and the reference observables. Let us consider a stochastic process

⁵We recall that there is considered the finite dimensional case. Thus there is no problem of the choice of topology.

(rescaling of the process $y(t, \omega)$) : $H(t, \omega) = 0$ if $y(t, \omega) = y_1$ and $H(t, \omega) = E$ if $y(t, \omega) = y_2$. Since the probability distributions of the processes $y(t, \omega)$ and $H(t, \omega)$ coincide, we have $p_C^{H(t)}(0) = p_C^{H(t_0)}(0)$; $p_C^{H(t)}(E) = p_C^{H(t_0)}(E)$.

If $E > 0$ we can interpret $H(t, \omega)$ as the energy observable and the operator \hat{H} as its Hilbert space image. We emphasize that the whole “energy process” $H(t, \omega)$ is represented by a single self-adjoint nonnegative operator \hat{H} in the Hilbert space. This is again a good illustration of incomplete QL representation of information. This operator, “quantum Hamiltonian”, is the Hilbert space projection of the energy process which is defined on the “prespace” Ω . In principle, random variables $H(t_1, \omega), H(t_2, \omega), t_1 \neq t_2$, can be very different (as functions of ω). We have only the law of *statistical conservation of energy*: $p_C^{H(t)}(z) \equiv p_C^{H(t_0)}(z)$, $z = 0, E$.

13 Concluding Remarks

We created an algorithm – QLRA – for representation of a context (in fact, probabilistic data on this context) by a complex probability amplitude.

QLRA can be applied consciously by e.g. scientists to provide a consistent theory which is based on incomplete statistical data. By our interpretation quantum physics works in this way. However, we can guess that a complex system could perform such a self-organization that QLRA would work automatically creating in this system the two levels of organization: CL-level and QL-level. Our hypothesis is that the brain is one of such systems with QLRA-functioning. We emphasize that in the brain QLRA-representation is performed on the unconscious level (by using Freud’s terminology: in the unconsciousness). But the final result of application of QLRA is presented in the conscious domain in the form of feelings, associations and ideas, cf. [23] and [24]. We guess that some complex social systems are able to work in the QLRA-regime. As well as for the brain for such a social system, the main advantage of working in the QLRA-regime is neglecting by huge amount of information (which is not considered as important). Since QLRA is based on choosing a fixed class of observables (for a brain or a social system they are *self-observables*), importance of information is determined by those observables. The same brain or social system can use parallelly a number of different QL representations based on applications of QLRA for different reference observables.

We can even speculate that physical systems can be (self-) organized through application of QLRA. As was already pointed out, Universe might be the greatest user of QLRA.

Conclusion. *The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics can be applied outside of physics, e.g., in cognitive, social, and political sciences, psychology, economics and finances.*

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